The Maori Party has entered into a relationship, supply and confidence agreement with the National Party marking the first time in post-war history that a Maori political entity has entered into a political relationship with a centre-right party. This raises the question - in the long term can the Maori Party survive life with the Nats?

This is pertinent as Labour is still the overwhelmingly preferred electoral choice for Maori. Since the mid-1930s, Labour has enjoyed strong support from Maoridom and this followed the First Labour Government's conclusion of a pact with Ratana MPs (backed by the Ratana Church). This was the case as up until that time, Maoridom tended to elect conservative Maori figures such as Sir Apriana Ngata to represent them. But this changed when Michael Joseph Savage, the country's first Labour PM, forged those close ties with the Ratana Movement. As a result, by the mid-1940s, all of the four Maori electorates had been won by Labour. 

This almost un-questioned political dominance was to remain until New Zealand First's Maori 'tight five' MPs swept all Maori electorates in 1996. As we now know, this change in political allegiance, at least at the constituency level, was short-lived for NZ First's five Maori MPs. In 1999, all of the Maori electorates returned to form by electing Labour MPs.

The restored political relationship between Labour and Maoridom looked stable, particularly during the period when the Labour-Alliance coalition held office during the 1999-2002 period. 'Closing the gaps' was then government policy and this sought to close the economic and social chasm that existed between Maori and Pakeha New Zealand. Then came the former Labour Government's introduction of the Foreshore and Seabed Act in 2004 which effectively terminated the rights of Maoridom to seek a judicial review as to whether or not they had a Treaty of Waitangi-based right to lay claim to tracts of it.

This abnegation of Maori rights by a Labour Party that had traditionally been more supportive of indigenous rights and aspirations (within certain limits) than their National Party opponents, was viewed as a betrayal by significant elements within Maoridom. The formation of the Maori Party by Tariana Turia was a result of that betrayal and in 2005, it won four out of the seven Maori constituencies.

What had not changed, despite this transferral of allegiance, was that in the era of MMP with the ability to split-vote, Maori kept overwhelmingly voting Labour with their party vote. At the recent general election, for example, while the Maori Party gained one additional electorate seat (Te Tai Tonga), Labour still overwhelmingly carried the party vote. This was even the case during the NZ First era in 1996 when Maori voters, appealed to by the likes of Winston Peters (whose whakapapa is part-Maori) and Tau Henare, were urged to cast their electoral ballots for a conservative party for the first time in over 50 years while their party votes were still cast for Labour.

Therein lies potential electoral danger for the Maori Party. Unlike NZ First, they have managed to hold and even increase their number of Maori seats into a second parliamentary term. However, their entering into a support and confidence agreement with National despite the vast majority of Maori voters still supporting Labour with their party vote could place all that gain at risk. Maori voters are mainly working class given their socio-economic profile. With a deeper recession now pending, Maori will bear the brunt of any economic downturn with job losses expected in blue-collar heavy industries such as construction, retailing and manufacturing. A centre-right government with a penchant for holding down government spending may not be advantageous for Maori either.

Besides, the agreement negotiated between National and the Maori Party is vague. Upon reading it, I was reminded of two of the most recent examples of supply and confidence agreements that the last Labour Government concluded with United Future and NZ First where, despite their respective party leaders Peter Dunne and Winston Peters winning policy concessions and ministerial posts, no electoral benefit was derived in that United Future lost most of its representation while NZ First was sent into political oblivion this year.

Although other factors, split caucases in the case of United Future and the Owen Glenn scandal in the case of NZ First, were at play in these parties poor showings, the Maori Party will have far more to fear by effectively coalescing with National. Therefore, even if National agrees (after promised reviews)to repeal the forshore and seabed legislation and retain the Maori seats, these wins maybe not enough, in and of themselves, to retain the support of Maori electors in three years time. With the global economic crisis predicted to run for another two years, there could be serious damage done to ordinary Maori people in that time to make them re-consider their electorate vote as social issues such as growing poverty and access to health and education could become more critical rather than just issues of historical injustice alone.

While Maoridom have made some gains under past Tory governments (with treaty claims gaining momentum under Jim Bolger's National administration) the overall record in terms of policy delivery for Maori from them remained poor.

While Labour needs to work on improving its image and support among Maori post-foreshore and seabed as well, the Maori Party may have done itself long-term damage by aligning with National. Furthermore, National didn't need the Maori Party to govern at all and if Tariana Turia and Pita Sharples have any sense, they should see that all John Key is doing is using them (and United Future) as a foil against the far-right extremists in Act. If the Maori Party leadership had any political nous, they could have stayed on the cross-benches as they did last term and wielded their influence as an independent party which represented Maori interests and aspirations. Furthermore, they could have moved to the left to outflank Labour earlier in their life in order to represent not only the cultural but class-based interests of their core low-income constituency, but this they chose not to do, choosing to spite Labour by cuddling up to the right instead.

This is why the Maori Party cannot survive life with the Nats. Their desire to repudiate any ideological understanding or concept of politics in favour of tikanga, while laudable, could ultimately end in their early demise as they misunderstand one thing - all politics is ideological - and the New Right has never been a friend of the majority of Maori.